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Questions & Answers

The moratorium covers the intentional release into the environment of:

  • Genetically engineered organisms of wild species — including gene drive organisms designed to spread engineered traits rapidly through wild populations, or genetically modified microbes released into soil or water.
  • Novel genetic elements — entirely new DNA sequences not found in nature, such as synthetic promoters that control gene expression, or engineered metabolic pathways that enable production of specific substances

It does not apply to laboratory research or to contained experimental trials conducted under biosafety standards.

Research continues — what is paused are risky environmental releases, until proper safeguards are in place.

Far from being indefinite, the moratorium is a bridge: it would remain in place until the IUCN World Conservation Congress votes to lift it. This would happen once IUCN members agree that:

  • Science can reliably predict outcomes,
  • Strong regulations are in place to prevent harm,
  • Safeguards are established to protect Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs), and
  • Broad societal consensus has been reached on whether—and under what conditions—nature should be engineered.

These are benchmarks of readiness, ensuring decisions are evidence-based and democratically endorsed.

Indeed, proposals to engineer nature differ in many ways — in purpose, context, and technology. Some aim to control invasive species, others to combat diseases in humans or wildlife, or to boost agricultural productivity. Methods range from old-style recombinant DNA techniques to creating entirely new genetic elements.

However, all share one concern: environmental release, even for trials, may cause irreversible harm to ecosystems, and current regulations are not equipped to guard against adverse outcomes for nature and people. 

That is why a time-bound moratorium is needed, until robust tools are in place to reliably assess and manage risks across this diversity of applications.

We are not advocating for inaction. We are calling for proven and safe conservation strategies and for action to address the main drivers of biodiversity loss: changes in land and sea use, direct exploitation of organisms, climate change, pollution and invasion of alien species.

The Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework sets urgent targets and actions by 2030 – a timeframe in which the limited use cases of genetic engineering cannot deliver results, with or without a moratorium.

Precaution is not inaction: it ensures efforts and funding go to solutions that deliver now, rather than speculative fixes that may never succeed.

Yes, but genetic engineering is not what IUCN defines as “transformative change”. According to the IUCN’s proposed “Nature 2030” vision, this includes:

  • Scaling up successful conservation,
  • Addressing harmful global change processes (climate change, land degradation, etc), and
  • Promoting equity and justice.

No.The moratorium (Motion 133) and the policy (Motion 087) serve different but complementary purposes:

Motion 087 establishes a long-term governance framework for all synthetic biology applications, regardless of type or context.

Motion 133 introduces a concrete, time-bound safeguard focussed on a clearly defined subset of applications: the environmental release of engineered wild species and novel genetic elements.

Far from contradicting the proposed policy, the moratorium operationalises its core principles in the highest-risk area, by applying precaution where there is potential for significant and irreversible harm while scientific uncertainties persist, reinforcing the protection of nature’s integrity, and advancing intergenerational equity.

The moratorium also fills a gap in Motion 087, which groups all synthetic biology approaches together despite vastly different risk profiles.

The CBD’s Cartagena Protocol and most national biosafety laws were designed for genetically modified crops, not wild species. Methods for the risk assessment of wild organisms are largely lacking, and post-release monitoring is hindered by the difficulty of locating engineered organisms in the wild.

Even in countries with advanced biosafety laws, experts warn that case-by-case risk assessments are limited by insufficient knowledge and a lack of robust methodologies and models (UBA et al, 2019).

Meanwhile, releases are planned in countries that have not ratified the Protocol – such as the US, Australia, and São Tomé and Príncipe – as well as in Protocol parties still lacking national biosafety laws.

At the international level, the cross-border spread of engineered organisms presents unresolved legal and governance challenges, as the Protocol’s definitions of “intentional” and “unintentional transboundary movement” are difficult to apply (Redford et al, 2019). Effective mechanisms for liability and redress remain absent.

Until these governance gaps are closed, any release risks running ahead of our ability to control it.

Lack of precaution: The policy groups together synthetic biology applications with very different risk profiles – from contained use of engineered bacteria in industrial settings to gene drives designed to eliminate entire wild populations. This blanket approach fails to establish necessary safeguards or “red lines” for high-risk applications that could cause irreversible harm to biodiversity.

Regulatory blind spots: The policy overlooks well-documented governance gaps, including the absence of a comprehensive international regulatory framework (IUCN briefing, 2024). It does not address the need for stronger national or global oversight.

Uncritical assumption of alignment with IUCN’s mission: The policy presumes all synthetic biology applications align with IUCN’s mission to protect nature’s integrity and diversity. However, the environmental release of genetically engineered wild species or novel genetic elements may directly conflict with that mission—and with IUCN’s commitments to intergenerational equity and the rights of Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities (IPLCs).

Departure from current IUCN policy: The policy departs from IUCN’s cautious stance in previous resolutions (Resolution 3.007 of 2004 calling for a moratorium on GMOs, Resolution 6.086 of 2016 advising against gene drive research). 

Without Motion 133, IUCN risks endorsing technologies before it has the tools and consensus to manage them responsibly.

No. Like all IUCN resolutions, the moratorium is non-binding. It does not restrict or override national or international decision-making. It expresses a collective recommendation from the IUCN membership.

It also respects sovereignty while signalling the collective responsibility to protect and restore global biodiversity.

Yes, some genetically modified organisms – like insects and wild plants – have already been released in countries like Brazil, the US, and Malaysia.

However, it’s not too late for IUCN to take a stand. Precisely because some releases have already happened, it is even more urgent for IUCN to draw a clear line now. Most high-risk projects are still in development stages.

Motion 087 would implicitly endorse genetic engineering as a conservation tool. Motion 133 sends a clear signal of caution: these technologies must not be fast-tracked without strong safeguards, evidence, and consensus.

Yes – but responsibly. The moratorium is not anti-innovation. It’s a call to recognise that some technologies, like genetic engineering of wild species in natural ecosystems, come with unprecedented and irreversible risks.

History shows that well-intentioned interventions — such as the introduction of cane toads in Australia and ferrets in New Zealand — can cause serious ecological harm. Synthetic biology could prove to be the most extreme example yet.

When applied to wild species, this technology can permanently alter ecosystems and evolutionary processes. The consequences of failure—disrupted food webs, species loss, and impacts on Indigenous stewardship—are far greater than with most other innovations.

Innovation in conservation should serve biodiversity and people —not gambling with ecosystems under the banner of urgency.

Not at all. The Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework identifies urgent actions needed by 2030. Most biodiversity targets can be achieved through scaling up existing conservation measures—such as habitat restoration, tackling pollution, and protecting IPLC stewardship. 

Genetic engineering of wild species is still experimental and cannot deliver results in that timeframe. Pausing risky technologies avoids distraction and misallocation of scarce resources.